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Executive Summary
INTRODUCTION
Globally, the majority of refugees are now in a protracted refugee situation, living in exile for at least five years
and with no sign of a durable solution. There are three possibilities for durable solutions: repatriation, local
integration, and resettlement. Repatriation remains the main durable solution for refugees, but the
circumstances should be conducive for return to the country of origin. In the meantime, local integration gives
refugees some certainty about what to do with their lives. Local integration can be regarded as a process with
three interrelated dimensions: legal, economic, and social. For the purposes of this paper, we examined the
level and extent of local integration of refugees in terms of economic inclusion.

METHODOLOGY
A review of literature was carried out to generate evidence on what works best for refugees’ local economic
integration in protracted refugee situations. Five countries, namely, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Jordan, and
Malaysia, were included for this exercise. The criteria used to select the countries for review were a large and
protracted refugee situation, initiatives on refugees’ right to work, geographic diversity, and level of economic
development. The review utilized both published and grey literature. Literature was identified through a
systematic search and screening process. A narrative review using a simple form of data extraction was
employed. The synthesis of evidence was based on three thematic focuses: refugees’ right to work, economic
opportunities for refugees, and integration of refugees. The report highlights the ways in which national policies
and initiatives on refugees’ right to work vary across five countries and the level and extent of economic
integration of refugees.

KEY FINDINGS
Refugee population
Uganda is the largest refugee-hosting country in Africa, with a refugee population of almost 1.5 million.
Uganda’s neighbors – Ethiopia and Kenya – are also major refugee-hosting countries in Africa. Ethiopia is the
third largest refugee-hosting country in Africa, with over 806,000 refugees and Kenya hosts over half a million
refugees. Jordan hosts over 660,000 Syrian refugees and Malaysia is a host to over 154,000 Myanmar
refugees. In all these five countries, the refugees find themselves in protracted situations and the prospect of
returning to their countries of origin is slim for most and the possibilities of resettlement in third countries is
currently unpredictable.

Refugee right to work
Uganda’s approach is noted as a model for refugee-hosting countries around the world because of its
progressive legislation granted by the 2006 Refugee Act and the Refugee Regulations 2010. In Uganda,
refugees are granted a wide range of rights and entitlements, including legal right to work, freedom of
movement, and access to services such as education and health. Uganda uses an open settlement policy: it
allows refugees plots of land for residence and cultivation. Refugees living outside the settlement can live and
buy property as permissible to any foreign nationals. There are no legal barriers to employment for refugees
and they have the right to work in the same manner as nationals except for employment in government
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agencies. Uganda is a pilot country of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). 1 The
Ugandan government is working toward achieving self-reliance and resilience among both the refugees and
refugee-hosting districts.
Ethiopia follows encampment practices, but refugees can leave the camp with a permit. Refugees are generally
not allowed to work in Ethiopia, but there are no legal restrictions on informal work. Since 2010, refugees have
been given the option of living outside of the camps as part of the government’s out-of-camp policy. Ethiopia
pursued restrictive labor policies for refugees in their country until the introduction of CRRF in 2017. The
framework proposes the provision of work permits to qualifying refugees, earmarking a percentage of jobs
within industrial parks, and providing access to irrigable land for refugees. Introduction of the CRRF represents
a major shift in Ethiopia’s refugee policy as refugees living in camps will benefit from paid employment, and
those in protracted situations will have opportunities to integrate locally and live outside camps.
In Kenya, refugees in general are not allowed to work formally. Until the 1990s, refugee policy favored local
integration. This integration policy was reversed in the early 1990s, when hundreds of thousands of refugees
arrived in Kenya. Then, the Kenyan government made a major shift in its refugee policy away from integration
and toward encampment. The 2006 Refugee Act conferred progressive rights to refugees. As a result, the
Kenyan government assumed more responsibility in registration and legal protection of refugees. The Act also
provided refugees the same rights to employment as other non-nationals and allowed them to have work
permits. Refugees have the option of obtaining work permits, usually for two years, as permissible for nonnationals. Camp residents in possession of a movement pass can travel to other parts of Kenya.
Since 2016, the Jordanian government has allowed both urban refugees and those refugees in the camps a
legal right to work. The government allows refugees to have work permits in certain occupations open to
immigrants/non-Jordanians. Camp refugees are allowed to work outside the camp which is conditional upon
securing legal permission to leave. Agricultural cooperatives allow free-of-charge work permits for refugees. In
November 2018, the Jordanian government issued a decision allowing refugees to establish their own homebased businesses in food processing, tailoring, and handicrafts.
Malaysia is not a signatory to the UN Convention on Refugees. The country has no legal or administrative
framework for dealing with refugees. Malaysia, on humanitarian grounds, generally allows asylum seekers and
refugees to stay in the country. Refugees are allowed to live in local communities once registered. The
Government of Malaysia’s current position is that refugees are not allowed to work lawfully in Malaysia, and
few receive assistance. The government has implemented several work permit schemes for small, select
groups of refugees, but so far its policies are ad hoc.

Economic integration of refugees
Uganda has a long history as a host country for refugees, and the integration of refugees into Ugandan society
has been a common occurrence. The legal structures of Uganda have shaped, and continue to shape, the
possibilities for local integration of refugees in this country. The Ugandan government’s approach to hosting
refugees is broadly characterized by opening its doors to all refugees; recognizing a wide array of rights of
refugees; confirming their implicit coverage by national policies, strategies, and plans; and integrating refugees
into local populations, e.g., via use of the same health, education, and agricultural extension services. In

In September 2016, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees
and Migrants. The New York Declaration sets out the key elements of a CRRF to be applied to large-scale movements of
refugees and protracted refugee situations. The CRRF is a multi-stakeholder coordination model on refugee matters
focusing on humanitarian and development needs of both refugees and host communities. UNHCR has been working with
countries and all other relevant stakeholders to develop and initiate the practical application of the CRRF in several
countries.
1
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Uganda, refugees are legally allowed to engage in both agricultural and a wide variety of non-agricultural
economic activities. The Ugandan government’s experience on local integration in harnessing development aid
for the mutual benefit of refugees and their hosts provides important lessons for policymakers and aid
organizations working in other host countries.
Ethiopia is a host country where there is no legal right to work, but informal work is permitted in practice. In
camps, refugees mostly survive on humanitarian assistance. Some are engaged in economic activities within
the camp or in the neighboring host markets. Refugees have access to incentive work 2 from UN agencies and
local NGOs. On the other hand, refugees settled in urban areas become progressively integrated there in
economic and social terms. Currently, the government of Ethiopia is in the process of adopting the CRRF
approach, similar to that of Uganda, on local integration of refugees. The strategy is to shift from a camp-based
model of refugee assistance to an approach which emphasizes refugee self-reliance and in-country refugee
mobility. Thus, local integration of refugees has become a possibility, but more efforts are required to assess
how it can be made an operational and sustainable reality.
In Kenya, a number of elements for informal integration exist for urban refugees. Urban refugees find
employment and self-employment opportunities mostly in the informal sector, which is highly competitive.
Outside the camp, some refugees are considered to have achieved a form of de facto integration as they have
become self-reliant through employment in the informal sector in Nairobi, are able to access some health and
educational services, and are socially networked into the host community. On the other hand, the local
integration of camp refugees is hard to achieve due to Kenya’s policy of encampment. Because of the remote
location of the camps and refugees’ physical curtailment, their socioeconomic opportunities are constrained by
a lack of mobility and right to work.
Jordan’s initiatives on labor force integration of refugees are seen as a durable solution. The Jordanian
government has taken an unprecedented step to support the integration of Syrian refugees into its labor force.
Jordan allows Syrian refugees to obtain legal work permits in its labor market and to pursue employment
opportunities in “sectors open to immigrants” such as agriculture, construction, services, wholesale trade, and
manufacturing in special economic zones. Jordanian exporters can enjoy trade benefits from European Union
countries in return for employing a minimum percentage of Syrian refugees. Syrian refugees in Jordan form an
important demographic in the labor market, comprising one-fifth of the total non-Jordanian workforce. Refugee
labor integration does not harm Jordan’s labor force, because Syrian refugees are working in the sectors
dominated by other migrant laborers.
Malaysian policy does not support local integration of refugees. However, many refugees work in the informal
sector, rent accommodations, access health care at government facilities, and pray at Malaysian mosques. Yet
many refugees spend years, decades, and even generations living in limbo, lacking the prospect of a formal
durable solution. The Malaysian government has pledged to allow refugees to work in the country;
implementation of this policy has, however, been slow. In the absence of strong political will within the
government, refugees in Malaysia can only be informally integrated into the economy and community, with no
future for themselves and the generation to come.

CONCLUSION
Refugee integration is determined by the conditions and environment in which their settlement occurs.
Refugees can be considered integrated with host economies when they have access to work permits and
business licenses, are able to secure livelihoods, and become less reliant on humanitarian assistance.

Humanitarian agencies can hire refugees as “incentive workers” for a fraction of the salary that host-country nationals
would receive in the same post, and the rates are well below the minimum wage.
2
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Opportunities for refugees to work are subject to the national policies and initiatives of host countries. A
comparison of the situation on legal right to work reveals a highly favorable condition for refugee rights in
Uganda among the five reviewed countries. Uganda has a national policy and well-defined framework
permitting refugees to work. In Jordan and Kenya, a certain proportion of refugees are allowed to work in
strictly defined sectors and occupations. In Ethiopia refugees are not allowed to work, but there are no legal
restrictions on informal work. The Ethiopian government is now focusing on measures to extend refugee rights
and relax its camp-based approach. Malaysia is found to be the most restrictive in terms of granting work
rights to refugees.
Of the five refugee-hosting countries, Malaysia is the most restrictive and least progressive with regard to
integrating refugees locally. Ethiopia is the next most restrictive host country in terms of refugee integration. In
host countries like Ethiopia with no existing national policy that respects refugees’ right to work, but no legal
restrictions on informal work, the potential for inclusion of refugees in the formal economy is high. In host
countries like Malaysia, where national policy prohibits refugees from working, there is no alternative but to
facilitate policy development to grant refugees the right to work. Advocacy efforts should build on the evidence
base demonstrating the potential and the positive impact that economic inclusion can have on refugees and
host communities.
A multicounty analysis of local integration of refugees has important implications for any host countries to
ensure the provision of employment and work for refugees. There are, however, differences in the economy
and labor market functions between countries, which pose challenges to policymakers and aid organizations.
None of the five countries belongs to the high-income economies. Uganda and Ethiopia are low-income
countries, Kenya lower-middle income, and Jordan and Malaysia upper-middle income. In the three African
countries included in this review, the labor market is mostly informal, while labor markets in Malaysia and
Jordan are largely formalized. The Ugandan model and the Jordanian approach are worthy of being replicated
in socioeconomically comparable host countries. Uganda provides a unique context for the investigation of
local integration as a durable solution. Uganda’s refugee legislature and policy are known worldwide, and
Ethiopia to some extent has begun to apply similar measures, as both these countries contain comparable
histories and socioeconomic contexts. Jordan’s initiative to integrate refugees into the labor market may be a
suitable measure for the upper-middle income economies having a more formalized labor market, like
Malaysia. Yet, the predetermined model or framework should not be readily adopted in situations of protracted
displacement without examining the legal, economic, and socio-cultural realities specific to the refugee
context.

x

I. Introduction
Globally, the majority of refugees are now in a protracted refugee situation, with no sign of a durable solution.
Situations of displacement are varied and subject to continuous change and there is rarely a predictable path
from displacement to return. In 2004, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defined a
major “protracted” refugee situation as a situation of 25,000 or more refugees that had been in existence for
five or more years with no immediate prospect of a durable solution. They are not always static populations;
there are often periods of increase and decrease in the numbers of people displaced and changes within the
population. Currently, nearly two-thirds of the world’s refugees are in situations of seemingly unending exile.
According to UNHCR, the 25 countries most affected by a prolonged refugee presence are all in the developing
world. There are some 30 major protracted refugee situations around the world. The average length of stay in
these states of virtual limbo is now approaching 20 years, up from an average of nine years in the early 1990s.
Thus, not only is a greater percentage of the world’s refugees in protracted exile than before but these
situations are lasting longer (Milner and Loescher 2011).
For refugees, there are three possibilities for durable solutions: repatriation, local integration, and resettlement
(Crisp 2003). Repatriation remains the main durable solution for refugees, but the circumstances must be
conducive for return. UNHCR works with hostcountry governments to find durable solutions for
BOX 1 Durable Solution for Refugees
each refugee and asylum seeker. Humanitarian
Once refugee status has been determined and immediate
assistance is often provided to refugee
protection needs are addressed, refugees may need support
populations in the early phases of displacement,
to find a long-term, durable solution. The concept of durable
but protracted displacement requires a shift to
solution has traditionally been associated with permanent
multiyear, more development-oriented
settlement, whether in the host country, a third country, or
programming to promote self-reliance among
the country of origin. UNHCR promotes three durable
refugee populations and to reduce their
solutions for refugees as part of its core mandate:
•
Voluntary repatriation
dependence and that of host communities, where
•
Local integration
such support is also provided, on costly external
•
Resettlement
assistance (Mathys 2016).
There is no hierarchy of durable solutions; rather, an
integrated approach that combines all three solutions and is
implemented in close cooperation with countries of origin,
host countries, humanitarian and development actors, as
well as the refugees themselves usually offers the best
chances for success.
Source: 50a4c17f9.pdf (unhcr.org)
Repatriation: Repatriation may be one solution for refugees
when they find it conducive to return to their home country
in safety and dignity. Voluntary return to the country of origin
is not immediately feasible.
Resettlement: For those who cannot return, either because
of continued conflict, wars, or persecution, resettlement in a
third country is one alternative.
Local integration: Another alternative for those who are
unable to return home is integration within the host
community. This is often a complex process which places
considerable demands on both the individual and the
receiving society. However, it also has benefits, allowing
refugees to contribute socially and economically.
Source: UNHCR - Solutions

In striving for sustainable interventions in
situations of protracted displacement, UNHCR
and donor countries are left with little option but
to consider initiatives aimed at local integration.
Rhetorically, integration has always been a
guiding principle of refugee programs in countries
of the Global South. According to the 1951 UN
Refugee Convention, restoring refugees to dignity
and ensuring the provision of human rights
includes an approach that would lead to their
integration in the host society. More recent
thinking, however, emphasizes both the
importance of maintaining individual identity and
the possibility of promoting self-reliance pending
voluntary return, whereby local integration could
be temporary (Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2004).
The notion of “local integration” is frequently used
in the refugee context, and yet it lacks any formal
definition in international refugee law. According

1

to Crisp (2004), local integration can be regarded as a process which leads to a durable solution for refugees.
It is a process with three interrelated dimensions. First, it is a legal process, whereby refugees are granted a
progressively wider range of rights and entitlements by the host state. Under the terms of the 1951 Refugee
Convention, these include, for example, the right to seek employment, to engage in other income-generating
activities, to own and dispose of property, to enjoy freedom of movement, and to have access to public
services such as education. Second, local integration can be regarded as an economic process. In acquiring
the rights and entitlements referred to above, refugees also improve their potential to establish sustainable
livelihoods, to attain a growing degree of self-reliance, and to become progressively less reliant on state aid or
humanitarian assistance. In accordance with these indicators, refugees who are prevented or deterred from
participating in the local economy, and whose standard of living is consistently lower than the poorest
members of the host community, cannot be considered to be locally integrated. Third, local integration is a
social process, enabling refugees to live among or alongside the host population, without fear of systematic
discrimination, intimidation, or exploitation by the authorities or people of the asylum country. It is
consequently a process that involves both refugees and the host population (Crisp 2004).
For the purposes of this report, we highlighted the refugee legal rights situation and then examined the level
and extent of local integration of refugees in terms of economic inclusion. In line with the study design, this
report does not discuss social integration of refugees. In particular, the report reflects on the refugees’ right to
work and their access to the labor market and potential to establish sustainable livelihoods in five selected
countries with protracted refugee situations.

2

II. Methodology
The purpose of the review is to generate evidence on what works best for refugees’ economic integration in
protracted refugee situations in five selected countries. The steps to conduct this secondary research included:
•

Country selection. Five countries, namely, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Jordan, and Malaysia, were
selected to understand refugee integration in different parts of the world. A protracted refugee
situation with large agglomerations of refugees (more than 100,000 refugees) was the key criterion
for selecting the countries for review. In selecting the countries, geographic diversity was also
accounted for. The presence of any pledges or initiatives on refugees’ right to work was another
selection criterion. The high-income countries that host refugees were excluded from the review.
Uganda was included because the country hosts the largest refugee populations in Africa and because
it is a country with many refugees experiencing protracted displacement. Similarly, Ethiopia and Kenya
are also major refugee-hosting countries in Africa. Ethiopia is the third largest refugee-hosting country
in Africa, with over 806,000 refugees, and Kenya hosts over half a million refugees. Jordan hosts over
660,000 Syrian refugees and Malaysia is a host to over 154,000 Myanmar refugees. None of the five
countries belongs to the high-income economies. Uganda and Ethiopia are low-income countries,
Kenya lower-middle income, and Jordan and Malaysia upper-middle income. In these five countries,
the refugees find themselves in protracted situations, the prospect of returning to their countries of
origin is slim for most of the refugees, and the possibilities of resettlement in third countries is
currently unpredictable. Bangladesh, a lower-middle income country in South Asia, hosting about one
million Myanmar refugees, was excluded because we conducted a separate study for Bangladesh
based on primary data under this project.

•

Literature search. The review utilized both published and grey literature. Journal articles, working
papers, evaluation reports, project reports/briefs, conference papers, and newspaper articles were
collected for review. Literature describing country experiences older than 10 years was excluded. The
review was based on the literature retrieved from an online search. Search terms included: refugee
integration, local integration of refugees, refugees’ right to work, economic opportunities for refugees,
and livelihood opportunities for refugees. The search also included the names of UN agencies and
international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working with refugees. In addition, literature was
collected through an online search of the websites of the host government ministries and departments
of refugee affairs. The search followed the websites of research institutes working with refugee and
international migration issues. From the selected literature, the bibliographies were checked to
identify papers missed in the initial search/compilation. Literature containing information on two
aspects of refugee integration—legal and economic—were selected for review.

•

Evidence synthesis. The review started with summarizing each piece of the selected literature through
a uniform review format. A narrative review using a simple form of data extraction was employed to
achieve an understanding about the policies and initiatives, as well as to assess the impact of these
initiatives where available, i.e., to generate knowledge on what approaches show the most promise for
addressing refugee right to work as well as the potential for local integration of refugees. Two
reviewers were employed to reduce bias. The review findings were compiled by country, and then
summarized and synthesized. The synthesis of evidence was based on three thematic focuses:
refugees’ rights to work, economic opportunities of refugees, and integration of refugees. A narrative
account of findings is presented.
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III. Lessons from Five Refugee-Hosting
Countries
UGANDA: A MODEL FOR LOCAL INTEGRATION OF REFUGEES
By May 2021, almost 1.5 million refugees lived in Uganda with around 62 percent of all refugees in Uganda
from South Sudan and another 29 percent from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The remaining 9
percent of refugees were from three countries: Burundi, Somalia, and Rwanda (UNHCR 2021a).

A. Legal context
The Government of Uganda (GoU) has a progressive policy approach to refugees, which recognizes a range of
refugee rights, including the right to land, freedom to work, unrestricted mobility, and the right to essential
social services. The two most important national legal instruments that explicitly address refugees are the GoU
Refugee Act 2006 and the GoU Refugee Regulations 2010. The Refugee Act 2006 defines the term “refugee”
and outlines the rights and responsibilities of refugees in Uganda. The law states that refugees have the right
to work, freedom of movement, and the right to live in settlements, all of which are designed to support selfreliance. The GoU Refugee Regulations 2010 further clarify the rights and obligations of refugees under
Ugandan law, in accordance with international standards and conventions (Mathys 2016).
Moreover, Uganda is a pilot country of the
BOX 2 Comprehensive Refugee Response
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
Framework
(CRRF). Since 2016, Uganda has implemented
the Refugee and Host Population Empowerment
On 19 September 2016, the United Nations General Assembly
strategy which aims to harmonize the refugee
unanimously adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees
response in Uganda by integrating refugee
and Migrants. The New York Declaration sets out the key
programming into the national development
elements of a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
plan. This strategy is a key component of the
(CRRF) to be applied to large-scale movements of refugees
and protracted refugee situations. The CRRF focuses on the
CRRF in Uganda, a multi-stakeholder approach
importance of supporting those countries and communities
with the objective of easing pressure on host
that host large number of refugees, promoting the inclusion of
countries and enhancing self-reliance of
refugees in host communities, ensuring the involvement of
refugees (Bohnet and Schmitz-Pranghe 2019).
development actors from an early stage, and developing a
“whole-of-society” approach to refugee responses. Its four key
objectives are to:
•
Ease the pressures on host countries and communities
•
Enhance refugee self-reliance
•
Expand third-country solutions
•
Support conditions in countries of origin for return in
safety and dignity
The CRRF is a multi-stakeholder coordination model on
refugee matters focusing on humanitarian and development
needs of both refugees and host communities. UNHCR has
been working with countries and all other relevant
stakeholders to develop and initiate the practical application
of the CRRF in a number of countries. Uganda is the first
country in Africa to apply CRRF.
Source: https://www.unhcr.org/new-york-declaration-forrefugees-and-migrants.html

B. Economic opportunities for
refugees
Access to land
Provision of land to refugees. Uganda’s
settlement approach foresees that refugees be
given a plot of land under the premise that this
enables self-reliance in the medium- and longrun. The norm has been to provide 30x30
square meters of residential land and 50x50
square meters for agriculture purposes to a
household. Refugee settlements are understood
as long-term structures that offer the possibility
for a degree of self-sufficiency as opposed to
camps (Bohnet and Schmitz-Pranghe 2019).

4

Settlement criteria. Uganda’s settlement approach is based on the principle of equity in welfare and service
provision between refugees and host communities. The local population provides land for a refugee settlement
in exchange for schools and health centers in the host community. So far, there is an agreement that 30
percent of international refugee assistance should directly target receiving communities. However, this
agreement is contested, and districts are increasingly pushing for a 50/50 ratio (Bohnet and Schmitz-Pranghe
2019).

Access to livelihood, employment, and business opportunities
In Uganda, refugees are placed within specific settlements by country of origin. In settlements, refugees
receive food or cash assistance for the first five years after arrival. Many refugees adopt livelihood coping
strategies. Refugees are allowed to engage in both agricultural and non-agricultural economic activities.
Economic opportunities for refugees in terms of employment (formal and informal) and access to productive
capital vary in rural and urban areas. More than 78 percent of refugees in rural settlements are engaged in
agricultural activities compared with 5 percent in urban areas. A variety of nonfarm activities supplement
agriculture, including trade, which is facilitated by the freedom of movement and right to work per the Ugandan
Refugee Act. Business enterprises such as bars, hairdressing, milling, transportation, money transfers, and
retail are run by refugees. In terms of employability and the economic integration of refugees, almost 43
percent are actively engaged in the labor market of their host communities: 12 percent in the formal sector
and 31 percent self-employed (World Bank 2016).
There are variations in economic activities between refugees of different origins. In Ugandan settlements for
Sudanese refugees, not many opportunities besides agriculture exist. The primary non-agricultural incomegenerating activities for refugees and Ugandans in areas receiving the most refugees are small businesses or
petty trade. The major sources of income are retail trading and selling fruit and vegetables. Sudanese refugees
also try to access bigger markets, where they get fruit cheaper and then sell the same fruit at a higher price
within their village (Bohnet and Schmitz-Pranghe 2019).
A comparative study on the economic outcomes of Congolese, Rwandan, and Somali refugees found that
Congolese and Rwandan refugees are most likely to engage in agricultural activity, farming their own plots or
working as farm laborers on the plots of other refugees. Where Congolese and Rwandans do engage in
entrepreneurship, it is mainly through small shops, hawking, or bars and restaurants. In contrast, Somalis
almost entirely shun agricultural work and instead engage in a huge range of entrepreneurial activities. Somali
entrepreneurs are more likely to scale a business to the point at which they can employ others. In urban areas,
the pattern differs. In urban Kampala, 95 percent of Congolese are self-employed, 78 percent of Rwandans,
and just 26 percent of Somalis (Betts, Omata, and Bloom 2017).
Economic activities of the refugees from a country vary by their location. Congolese refugees in Rwamwanja
Settlement practice predominantly agricultural livelihoods. The most important income sources for refugees in
Rwamwanja were crop production and sale, followed by agricultural wage labor. Refugees in Rwamwanja
supplement agricultural labor with a range of income-generating activities (Government of Uganda, UNHCR,
and World Bank 2016). Congolese refugees living elsewhere in Uganda portray diverse livelihood patterns
including on-farm and off-farm activities. Among refugees in Kyangwali and Nakivale Settlements, Congolese
refugees most frequently reported that their top source of livelihood was farming their own plots, followed by
farm labor for others, construction work, running a small shop, or employment with an organization. Congolese
refugees who have self-settled in urban areas, primarily in Kampala, were the most likely to report engagement
in various types of businesses (e.g., selling clothes or textiles, tailoring, brokerage, or providing hair and beauty
services) as their top source of livelihood, rather than agriculture (Betts et al. 2014).
Refugees have higher income and lower dependency levels in the city compared with those in settlements. In
terms of dependency on aid agencies, most refugees in Kampala do not receive any form of assistance from
the aid agencies, and therefore only 9.4 percent of total respondents consider their households “very
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dependent” on support from UNHCR and other aid agencies. In contrast, in the settlement refugees are highly
dependent on assistance. In Nakivale and Kyangwali, 59 percent of refugees are “very dependent” on
assistance from aid organizations, and it is much higher in Rwamwanja with 78 percent (Betts, Omata, and
Bloom 2017).

Challenges for refugees to access employment and business
Bohnet and Schmitz-Pranghe (2019) identified inadequate infrastructure as a factor limiting refugee access to
employment and business opportunities. Despite the right of refugees to work in Uganda, employment
opportunities are minimal as a result of the remote location of many settlements within economically weak
regions of the country, considerable constraints to the freedom of movement, and insufficient education and
training opportunities. Settlements are less economically integrated. Refugees are mainly engaged in livelihood
activities associated with low incomes and no job security. Many refugees cannot benefit from their right to
employment or free movement because the refugee settlements offer hardly any sustainable job opportunities,
and infrastructure that would connect refugees with markets is poor. Even if they manage to establish a small
business, buyers and markets are insufficient to attain self-reliance. Thus, most refugees remain reliant on
food rations which lately have also been reduced (Bohnet and Schmitz-Pranghe 2019).
Additionally, Betts, Omata, and Bloom (2017) found that the greatest barriers to businesses is lack of access
to finance and capital, given restrictions on refugees’ access to formal banking facilities. This was most
significantly identified by self-employed Congolese in Kampala. Other reported barriers included the price of
government business permits, xenophobia and discrimination, and language barriers (Betts, Omata, and
Bloom. 2017).

C. Integration of refugees
Uganda has a welcoming context for refugees in the region that is exemplary compared to all other countries
that host refugees. The Ugandan government’s approach to hosting refugees is broadly characterized by:
opening its doors to all refugees; recognition of a wide array of rights of refugees; confirming their implicit
coverage by the Ugandan Constitution as well as national policies, strategies, and plans; integration of
refugees into local populations (e.g., via use of the
same health, education, and agricultural extension
BOX 3 Refugee integration in Uganda
services); promoting their self-reliance; and seeking
Uganda’s progressive approach is held up as a model for
equity in welfare and service provision between
other countries. The approach is one focused on selfrefugees and hosting-district populations (Mathys
reliance as part of long-term approaches.
2016).
•
Refugees are not held in camps and they can work
•

•
•
•

•

and access services such as education and health on
par with nationals.
Inside the settlement, they are given plots of land for
residence and cultivation. However, these lands are
given on tenure. Refugees living outside the
settlement can live and buy property as permissible
to any foreign nationals.
Refugees are entitled to identity cards and birth and
death registration with fees waived.
Education is available for refugee children and
primary education is free, similar to that of Ugandan
children.
There are no legal barriers to employment for
refugees and they have the right to work in the same
manner as nationals except that refugees are not
allowed to seek employment in government agencies.
Refugees can access credit such as mortgages, as
any other foreign national can.

The GoU demonstrates a commitment to linking
humanitarian aid with development initiatives in
order to support refugees in reaching their durable
solutions. Significant progress has been made in
terms of integrating refugees into Uganda’s
National Development Plan II. The major policy
initiative adopted by the Ugandan government
toward integration of refugees is the CRRF, which
aims to provide support for the development of
sector-specific response plans in refugee-hosting
districts (Bern 2016).
Uganda strongly envisions the integration of
services to host and refugee populations. Integrated
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services to refugee-hosting areas are provided ensuring that refugees and host communities benefit from
shared, rather than parallel, services. Shared services among refugees and their hosts provide a platform for
the integration of refugees. Health and education services are considered to be the most integrated services.
Refugee children are allowed to access government-aided schools, use the Ugandan curriculum, and are
taught in English as the common language of instruction. Both refugees and Ugandan nationals can access
free primary health care at facilities (Bern 2016).
There are gaps between intentions in policy and reality for integration of refugees in the Ugandan context. Even
though refugees in Uganda, in theory, have access to land, employment, and education, and have the right to
free movement, the situation on the ground provides a different picture. Most refugees have so far not
achieved the goal of local integration, i.e., the ability to sustain a living and being socially integrated into the
local Ugandan community. However, refugees with some income or ability to fend for themselves are selfsettled in urban centers (Bohnet and Schmitz-Pranghe 2019).
Uganda is a low-income country, which hosts about 1.5 million refugees. The following are recommendations
based on the Ugandan case study for policymakers and aid organizations to apply in other low-income,
refugee-receiving contexts:
•

Merely establishing the right to employment, free movement, and a plot of land for refugees does not
suffice to guarantee the self-reliance or local integration of refugees. Instead, governments and aid
organizations must make sure that refugees can also benefit from their rights by providing the
necessary infrastructure so that they can move freely and access markets.

•

Refugees and local communities should be addressed in the same manner by the Ugandan
government and aid agencies to prevent competition and conflict, since locals are often no better off
than refugees.
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ETHIOPIA: INFORMAL ACCESS TO WORK FOR REFUGEES
Ethiopia is currently the third largest refugee-hosting country in Africa, with 806,541 refugees as of 31 May
2021. The refugees are South Sudanese (46 percent), Somalis (26 percent), Eritreans (21 percent), Sudanese
(6 percent), and other nationalities (1 percent) (UNHCR 2021b). Most of these refugees reside in camps
located in remote areas near their respective country’s borders, with limited schools, health facilities, food,
clean water, sanitation, and household energy (Yusuf and Khalif 2018).

A. Legal context
The Government of Ethiopia (GoE) generally maintains an open-door asylum policy and has hosted refugees
from neighboring conflict-affected countries for decades. Despite having an open-door policy toward refugees,
there is no provision in Ethiopian law for local integration and there are considerable restrictions on refugee
freedom of movement, with the government maintaining an encampment policy for the majority of refugees
(Brown et al. 2018a).
The GoE enforced an encampment policy that required all refugees to live in designated camps, barred
refugees from the labor market, and imposed restrictions on other key rights related to economic inclusion,
including property ownership and the ability to access financial services. In 2010, to reduce reliance on the
camp system, the government began to loosen some of the restrictions on refugees with the passage of an
Out-of-Camp Policy (OCP) that allowed refugees to apply for permits to live outside camps (Graham and Miller
2021).
To apply for an OCP permit, refugees must have lived in the camps for three months, have no criminal record,
and must demonstrate that they can support themselves, usually through relatives or remittances (Brown et al.
2018a). They must be sponsored by a relative who is an Ethiopian citizen, who signs an agreement with the
relevant Ethiopian authority that they can cover the refugee’s living expenses. For many refugees, the sponsor
requirement is a major barrier. OCP beneficiaries are given the right to reside outside the camps, but they are
still not granted the right to work and must therefore work informally, if at all. In practice, informal livelihoods
are tolerated—and recently even supported through government-sanctioned livelihood programs. As of 2018,
there were almost 20,000 OCP beneficiaries, about 2 percent of all refugees in the country at that time
(Graham and Miller 2021).
Fortunately, the country is making progress—albeit somewhat slowly. In 2016, Ethiopia took a major step
toward a more inclusive refugee legal framework. In September of that year, at the Leaders’ Summit on
Refugees in New York, the GoE made “Nine Pledges” related to increasing the economic and social inclusion of
refugees in the country (see Box 4). These pledges represented a major policy shift and positioned Ethiopia as
an emerging leader in progressive refugee policy (Graham and Miller 2021). The strategy aims to gradually
phase out the camp-based assistance model the country has been implementing for decades (Abebe 2018).

B. Economic opportunities for camp refugees
Currently, Ethiopian law dictates that most refugees, with relatively few exceptions, must live in the designated
camps throughout the country, and very few refugees have been granted the right to work. Thus, most refugees
lack freedom of movement and can only work informally in the limited markets in and around camps or risk
living illegally outside camps. Although most refugees worked in agriculture or pastoralism prior to being
displaced, few have access to land. There are limited pathways to obtaining work permits, so most refugees do
not have access to formal labor markets and face potential harassment, exploitation, and criminal charges
working in the informal market. Moreover, unclear regulations inhibit refugees’ access to financial services,
and the few refugees who live outside camps have trouble accessing government services (Graham and Miller
2021).
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Refugees are not allowed to work in Ethiopia. Yet, they engage in the economy and interact with host
communities through incentive work for local NGOs and UN agencies, the sale of rations on local markets,
engagement in small business activities supported by livelihoods programming, informal trade and economic
exchange with host communities, or work through informal agreements with local employers (ReDSS 2018).
Conditions for economic activities are challenging in the camp. Nevertheless, refugees are actively engaged in
economic activities. The Jigjiga region in eastern Ethiopia bordering Somalia hosts Somali refugees across
three refugee camps. The area is resource-poor, remote, and refugees are constrained in their freedom of
movement and right to work. Nonetheless, many refugees continue to pursue economic activities, particularly
trade in small ruminants and informal business activities in other trade and services. Generally, the markets
are well-integrated with local host communities, who engage in similar business activities and who constitute
key consumers and suppliers to the camps’ markets (Yusuf and Khalif 2018).
There was strong resilience among refugee business owners considering the context in which they operated.
Other factors enhancing livelihood opportunities were the existence of social capital and networks, collective
efforts within the camps such as group savings and lending, and the existence of some skill sets acquired
formally or informally. It was also noted that the cash transfer programming implemented in the camps was
fueling spending and some investments, and improved household well-being (Yusuf and Khalif 2018).
In the camp, a number of factors hindered refugee businesses, including restrictions on movement and lack of
access to capital, lack of refugee markets and business spaces within the camps, and inadequacy of business
skills. Furthermore, with the encampment policy, locally produced goods could not be marketed. Even though
the number of businesses in the refugee camps continues to rise, the market potential will limit growth unless
new growth sectors emerge, or the potential of existing sectors is unlocked (Yusuf and Khalif 2018).
Some organizations were supporting livelihoods initiatives (mainly in agriculture and livestock, vocational skills,
microfinance, and income-generating activities) for host and refugee communities, though the projects
implemented were small, reaching a limited number of refugees. Refugees’ vocational skills were not good
enough to get employment. The skills trainings were also not supported by access to labor market information,
placement, or job-search support (Yusuf and Khalif 2018).

C. Economic opportunities for refugees in urban setting
Although still relatively small, Addis Ababa’s refugee population is the largest urban refugee population in
Ethiopia. There are an estimated 31,000 refugees in Addis Ababa. Refugees are permitted to live in Addis
Ababa if they have specialist medical needs or face serious protection concerns. In addition, refugees from
non-neighboring countries without designated camps (e.g., Yemen, Syria, and Afghanistan) and Eritrean
refugees are granted OCP status. There is no formal policy for granting urban refugees’ access to services such
as education, water, or health care, and refugees are not incorporated in urban development plans at federal
or local levels. Furthermore, there are limited protection mechanisms in the city for urban refugees (Brown et
al. 2018a).
Refugee economies are diverse and highly integrated into the city’s economy and make significant
contributions in terms of job creation and in developing local and international markets.
Though informal, there are several positive developments in the labor market of Addis Ababa. Informal
employment was widespread with refugees employed in Ethiopian-owned and refugee-owned informal
enterprises or joint refugee-Ethiopian owned shops. Refugees were also employed as casual day laborers in
construction. A significant number were skilled workers (e.g., electricians, welders, or mechanics). Running
informal enterprises is another major source of income for refugees in Addis Ababa. Many refugees were selfemployed or ran micro-enterprises. They ran informal enterprises involved in service provision (such as
hairdressing, laundry, translation, rental brokers, plumbers, and mechanics), retail, leisure and hospitality
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businesses, and construction. Some enterprises were run under a license belonging to an Ethiopian (Brown et
al. 2017).
Business clusters are formed and new markets for both local and refugee communities created. Reciprocal
employment was common, as both local and refugee businesses sought to reach customers in the other
community (local or refugee). Some Ethiopian-owned businesses employed refugees, but the majority of
businesses said they would hire refugees if the practice were legal. On the other hand, more than half of
refugee-owned businesses employed Ethiopians as waiters, hairdressers, retail workers, guards, and
mechanics. In addition, skilled refugees worked in local schools, hospitals, nightclubs, and formal
organizations. Refugees were employed informally by formal organizations, for example as nurses in private
clinics and as translators (Brown et al. 2017).
Though government officials suggest that informal work is tolerated, in practice refugees face considerable
livelihood challenges. Limited access to employment resulting from the lack of a legal right to work is the most
significant barrier to securing refugee livelihoods. Lack of access to business licenses means most refugee-run
businesses operate under a license belonging to an Ethiopian business, limiting reinvestment and growth
potential. With no labor protections, refugees face workplace discrimination that includes low wages, wages
being withheld, or payments being made in the form of “incentive money” rather than regular salaries, or
employment being ended arbitrarily (Brown et al. 2017).

D. Integration of refugees
Ethiopia’s refugee policy requires refugees to live in camps, with the exception of a small number of people
who are allowed to stay in urban centers because of serious protection concerns or special health needs. Since
2010, many more have been given the option of living outside the refugee camps as part of the government’s
OCP initiative. All OCP beneficiaries are required to sustain themselves financially (Abebe 2018).
Generally, Ethiopia has pursued restrictive labor policies for refugees. Refugees mostly survive on
humanitarian assistance, which in some situations has created aid dependency. Some are engaged in
economic activities within the camp or in the neighboring host markets. The isolation of the camps coupled
with restrictions on access to labor markets and employment resulted in a challenging environment for
sustainable livelihoods for refugees (Yusuf and Khalif 2018). On the other hand, refugees settled in urban
areas become progressively integrated there in economic and social terms. Overall, the refugees’ economies
and the success of their livelihood efforts were constrained by a number of factors, most of which were
external to them, including the GoE policies, the rules and regulations in place, and the absence of and lack of
access to supporting functions.
The GoE has begun to implement policy changes in order to create more economic and social rights for
refugees. For example, in 2017 Ethiopia agreed to be a pilot country for the CRRF, an approach to supporting
refugees and host communities led by the UNHCR that aims to create conditions for greater refugee selfreliance—by reducing encampment and increasing access to local economies and labor markets—while also
providing increased support to hosting countries, expanding opportunities for resettlement, and fostering
conditions for voluntary return (Graham and Miller 2021). The CRRF serves as a means to implement the “Nine
Pledges” and envisions bringing durable solutions for refugees and supporting host communities. Key pledges
include providing work permits to qualifying refugees, facilitating local integration to those in protracted
situations, earmarking a percentage of jobs within industrial parks, and providing access to irrigable land for
refugees (Abebe 2018).
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BOX 4 Ethiopia’s Nine Pledges
1. Expand the number of OCP beneficiaries to 10 percent
of the total refugee population.
2. Increase school enrollment for refugees.
3. Provide work permits to refugees with permanent
residence IDs.
4. Provide work permits to refugees in the areas
permitted for foreign workers.
5. Make irrigable land available to 100,000 people,
including refugees and host communities.
6. Build industrial parks and set aside a percentage of
jobs in these parks for refugees.
7. Make more documentation available to refugees,
including birth certificates and, possibly, driver’s
licenses. Allow refugees to open bank accounts.
8. Expand and enhance the provision of basic social
services for refugees.
9. Allow local integration for refugees who have lived in
Ethiopia for 20 years or more.
Source: Ethiopia CRRF Roadmap, March 2018
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/62655

With the Nine Pledges, there is a window of
opportunity to allow for economic integration and use
that as a medium for social cohesion and local
integration (ReDSS 2018). Implementation of the
CRRF represents a major shift in Ethiopia’s refugee
policy. Refugees living in camps will benefit from paid
employment. Those in protracted situations will have
opportunities to integrate locally and live outside the
camps. Jobs will be created for host communities and
the government will access international finance and
political benefits (Abebe 2018). This is a vital step
toward the transition from de facto to de jure right to
work for refugees in Ethiopia. It marks the inception
of a shift from a camp-based model of refugee
assistance to an approach which emphasizes refugee
self-reliance, refugee mobility in-country, and the
integration of refugees into regional and national
development processes (ReDSS 2018).
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KENYA: ACCESS TO WORK FOR URBAN REFUGEES
Kenya has a long history of hosting large numbers of refugees in the country. By the end of January 2021,
Kenya was host to some 508,033 refugees and asylum seekers. The majority of refugees and asylum seekers
are from Somalia (54 percent), followed by the South Sudanese (25 percent), Congolese (9 percent), and
Ethiopians (6 percent). The remaining refugees are from Burundi, Sudan, Uganda, Eritrea, and Rwanda. Almost
half of the refugees in Kenya reside in Dadaab (44 percent), 40 percent in Kakuma, and 16 percent in urban
areas, mainly Nairobi (UNHCR 2021c).

A. Legal context
Until the 1990s, refugee policy favored local integration. The Government of Kenya (GoK) provided limited
support, and responsibility for the integration of refugees lay largely with churches and aid organizations. This
integration policy was reversed in the early 1990s, when hundreds of thousands of refugees arrived in Kenya
fleeing conflict and insecurity in Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC. The scale and
profile of the new arrivals prompted a major shift in Kenyan refugee policy away from integration and toward
encampment (O’Callaghan and Sturge 2018). The new strategy, the camp option, was deemed the most
appropriate by both the Kenyan government and UNHCR because it allowed for the provision of assistance to
the large numbers of arriving refugees, while also protecting Kenya’s national security interests and facilitating
the repatriation of refugees.
Kenya’s 2006 Refugees Act stipulated that refugees live in “designated areas,” but no areas were officially
assigned until the government designated Kakuma and Dadaab in March 2014. This policy was further
formalized in 2016 through amendments to 2009 regulations issued under the Refugees Act, specifying that
“[a] refugee or an asylum seeker shall be required to reside within a designated refugee camp” and that
refugees “who wish to reside outside a designated refugee camp shall apply to the Commissioner for Refugee
Affairs for an exemption” (World Bank 2019). A new Refugee Bill was passed through parliament in 2017.
Accounts indicate that there may be greater provisions for refugee self-reliance, including the potential for
refugees to access land and work permits (O’Callaghan and Sturge 2018).
In Kenya, camp residents in possession of a movement pass can travel to other parts of Kenya. Passes are
issued for a limited set of reasons, such as medical or higher educational requirements or protection concerns
in camps. Despite the policy of encampment, many urban refugees remain outside camps, with their presence
implicitly endorsed by the Kenyan authorities, which have registered some of them in urban areas. In early
2012, the Refugee Consortium of Kenya reported more welcoming procedures for refugees in urban centers
than in camps (O’Callaghan and Sturge 2018; Refugee Consortium of Kenya 2012).
The 2006 Refugees Act marked a turning point for the Kenyan government to assume more responsibility in
registration and protection. The Act conferred progressive rights to refugees, most notably including
reaffirmation of the government’s commitment to international refugee conventions; recognition of asylum
seekers and refugees along with issuance of a refugee identity card; protection from arbitrary arrest, detention,
or expulsion; and recognition of refugee rights to economic and productive activities. The Act stipulates that
refugees should be provided with a “refugee identity card.” These take the form of either a UNHCR Mandated
Refugee Certificate that is valid for two years, or the Department of Refugee Affairs issued Alien Refugee
Certificate, valid for five years (UNHCR 2012).

The right to work
The 2006 Refugees Act provides refugees the same rights to employment as other non-nationals. Employment
of non-nationals is governed by the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act 2011, under which work permits,
called “Class M permits,” are granted, usually for two years. Applications for permits also need a
recommendation from a prospective employer and must be accompanied by a letter from the authority
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confirming refugee status. While refugees may therefore theoretically work, in practice this is reportedly much
more difficult, perhaps partly as a result of Kenya’s high unemployment rate of over 39 percent and high
dependence on the informal economy. The Refugee Consortium of Kenya stated in 2012 that the government
only issues work permits to asylum seekers or refugees in a few isolated cases. Thus, refugees, both skilled
and unskilled, seek employment in the informal sector. A thriving informal economy has emerged in the camps,
and most refugees in urban centers rely on Kenya’s extensive informal economy (O’Callaghan and Sturge
2018).

B. Economic opportunities for camp refugees
The GoK established the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps in the early 1990s to accommodate the influx of
refugees. There are now over 400,000 refugees in the camps. The majority of them have been living in the
camps (or in other places in Kenya) for more than two decades. In both Dadaab and Kakuma, reliance on
humanitarian assistance remains crucial for many refugees, and especially so for new arrivals. Despite
restrictions on work, refugees, both skilled and unskilled, are employed by aid organizations in Kakuma and
Dadaab, where they are paid “incentives” (rather than full salaries), as well as in the informal sector. An active
informal economy, dominated by longer-staying refugees, has emerged in the camps (Betts, Omata, and Sterck
2018; O'Callaghan et al. 2019).
Dadaab refugees have been receiving assistance for over 20 years, and there has been a realization that the
orientation of this support needs to change in a manner that will provide more self-sustaining skills to
refugees, whether they return to Somalia, stay in Dadaab, or find themselves elsewhere in Kenya or in other
countries (Kamau and Fox 2013). Dadaab’s refugees are reluctant to leave. The reasons for this vary, but most
still feel it is too unsafe to return. Others feel there are more opportunities in Kenya, or simply hold no ties to
their “homeland,” having been born in the camp (UNHCR 2012). In a study on livelihood activities and
opportunities for Dadaab refugees, Kamau and Fox (2013) found that only 2 percent of refugees in Dadaab
relied entirely on humanitarian assistance. The study explored economic opportunities for refugees in camps
as follows (Kamau and Fox 2013):
•

Employment. With regard to employment by the aid agencies, as refugees are not allowed to work in
Kenya, it is only possible to hire refugees as “incentive workers,” for a fraction of the salary that a Kenyan
national would receive in the same post, and the rates are well below the minimum wage. Another source
of income is casual work. The refugees who can afford it employ other refugees as laundry workers, or
salesperson in their small vegetable and tea kiosks, for very little pay. Overall, difficulty in obtaining work
permits limits the opportunities for employment of refugees in Dadaab or elsewhere in Kenya.

•

Trade. Trade is big business within the camps. Through their networks in Kenya and back in Somalia,
refugee traders are able to source and sell their goods, usually at lower rates than those in other parts of
the country. In 2010 there were an estimated 5,000 businesses in Dadaab, ranging from petty traders to
large concerns.

•

Skills training. In Dadaab, there are a variety of livelihood projects supported by agencies. These include
the provision of vocational training and support in areas such as electronics, welding and fabrication,
carpentry, tailoring, mechanics, plumbing, tie and dye, weaving, poultry keeping, hairdressing and beauty,
soapmaking, and small-scale agricultural activities. Other longer-term support is also provided in the form
of literacy and numeracy skills training, information and communication technology skills development,
and entrepreneurship skills training. Some of these programs run for a period of one year, others for a
few months, with trainees being, on average, between the ages of 15 and 30 years. The emphasis of
most projects was found to be on the youth and women.
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In the Kakuma camp, the refugee economy is dynamic: the majority of refugees engaged in economic activities
in the camp work for humanitarian agencies, in shops, or in construction, with activities ranging from
pharmacies to money transfer companies and breweries. Of those reporting a cash income, the largest source
was from employment (36 percent), followed by remittances (29 percent) and business (20 percent). In 2016,
Kakuma camp had more than 2,150 shops, including 14 wholesalers (Vemuru et al. 2016).
In both the Dadaab and Kakuma camps, refugees have developed diverse livelihoods. Refugees, while poor,
are economically active and doing business with local communities. In terms of income sources of refugees,
along with remittances, the main sources of income are employment and income from running a business.
Incentive work for aid organizations accounts for approximately 5,000 jobs in Kakuma and an even greater
number of jobs in Dadaab. In the Kakuma and Dadaab camps, host markets are dwarfed by refugee markets
in terms of size and activity, showcasing the enterprising livelihood strategies that refugees have developed
(World Bank 2019).
The refugee camps in Kakuma and Dadaab are located in regions that are relatively underdeveloped,
characterized by difficult socioeconomic conditions that include food insecurity, limited access to basic social
services and economic infrastructure, and poor livelihood opportunities (World Bank 2019). The economy of
those camps is limited. For example, markets in Dadaab that are accessible to refugees do not offer an
adequate avenue for the range of products produced by the refugees. The absorption capacity within Dadaab
for refugee-made services and products is minimal (Kamau and Fox 2013).

C. Economic opportunities for non-camp refugees
Almost one-sixth of asylum seekers and refugees in Kenya live in urban areas, mainly in Nairobi. Refugees in
Nairobi are able to access better mobility and public services, but they largely give up access to assistance by
coming to urban areas. As a result, they need to be economically independent, with many refugees, particularly
men, working. In Nairobi’s urban areas, most refugees tend to operate small businesses, find daily casual labor
opportunities, and be employed in various retail outlets. Work for casual laborers is widely available and casual
labor opportunities are predominantly male activities. Most refugee households seek informal work on a daily
basis, and many are low-skilled workers. Petty trade is a common activity among Nairobi’s female refugees,
and this commonly involves selling food, fruits and vegetables, water, handicrafts, and clothes (UNHCR 2012;
World Bank 2019).
Overall, refugees find employment and self-employment opportunities in the highly competitive informal sector.
Work permits are not required for casual jobs and refugees accept lower wages in return for work without a
background check. The business community is hesitant to engage refugees as a potential market. Without
ownership of fixed assets those seeking to start or grow a business fail to meet the collateral requirements to
access business loans (UNHCR 2012).
Nairobi’s refugees, who have opted to avoid camps for reasons of protection or opportunity, are generally selfreliant and tend to be in a better economic position than those in the camps. Their skills, determination, and
resilience have resulted in economic benefits for the host community. However, this does not mean that all
urban refugees are wealthy and have achieved full integration into Nairobi’s economy. A very low number,
estimated at only 2 percent, have a Class M permit, which allows them to work in the formal economy (Refugee
Consortium of Kenya 2015). The few refugees in this position can own their own businesses and make
significant profits. The great majority, however, engage in activities below and different to their professional
training and competency, and rely on their own means or that of relatives to survive. A recent study showed
that refugee incomes were almost equally split between business (29 percent), employment (28 percent), and
remittances (30 percent), with only 3 percent relying on NGO assistance (O’Callaghan and Sturge 2018;
Refugee Consortium of Kenya 2015).
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D. Integration of refugees
Kenya’s legal and policy environment in relation to refugees is restrictive and dominated by an encampment
approach, but the practice often diverges from policy. Despite the encampment approach, at least 16 percent
of refugees reside in urban areas. In Kenya, the vast majority of refugees are engaged in economic activities in
the informal sector and have made modest gains with limited support from the Kenyan government or the
humanitarian community. A minority of urban refugees are successful entrepreneurs providing much social
and economic benefit to the communities they reside in. This minority provides a picture of what asylum
seekers and refugees can achieve if they are explicitly conferred the right to work and reside in Nairobi, and
with that, access to the necessary services and opportunities (Kamau and Fox 2013).
Refugees in the camps remain economically vulnerable, with few assets and limited options for employment.
The local integration of camp refugees is difficult to achieve. The Dadaab camp is harsh and remote, limiting
the livelihood choices for the refugees. Because of the remote location of the camps and physical curtailment,
refugees’ socioeconomic opportunities are constrained by their lack of mobility and right to work (O’Callaghan
and Sturge 2018).
A scenario involving partial or full integration of Kenya’s camp-based refugees appears remote, but there are
some indications of a shift in refugee management toward greater self-reliance. Kalobeyei – a dedicated
settlement set up to host both refugees and locals – was established in 2015 some 40 km north-west of the
Kakuma camp to promote self-reliance through enhanced service delivery and better livelihood opportunities
for 60,000 refugees and 20,000 Kenyans (O’Callaghan et al. 2019). Drawn from examples in Uganda, the GoK
is implementing this innovative approach to refugee management with the objective of contributing to the
improvement of the socioeconomic conditions of the refugees and host communities and reducing
overdependence on humanitarian aid and helping refugees achieve durable solutions. It is a 15-year plan to
develop the settlement with greater income-earning opportunities, urban and agricultural and livestock
development, integrated service delivery, and private-sector engagement, with the intention for the settlement
to eventually become an urban center (O’Callaghan and Sturge 2018).
In comparison with their camp compatriots, refugees in Nairobi enjoy much higher levels of integration due to
their ability to draw on their own skills, adaptability, and networks to navigate Nairobi’s informal economy and
wider socio-political environment. Urban refugees are considered to have achieved a form of de facto
integration as they are no longer in physical danger or at risk of refoulement, are not confined to camps or
settlements, can sustain a livelihood, are self-sufficient and have similar standards of living to their hosts, have
access to public services, and are socially networked into the host community (O’Callaghan and Sturge 2018).
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JORDAN: A MODEL FOR LABOR FORCE INTEGRATION OF REFUGEES
Since 2011, Jordan has been hosting a substantial number of refugees from Syria. Over 666,000 refugees
from Syria are registered with UNHCR in Jordan. Of the 666,294 registered Syrian refugees, only 126,131 live
in camps. The breakdown by camp is 78,545 in Zaatari, 40,738 in Azraq, and 6,848 in Mrajeeb al Fhood
(UNHCR 2018).

A. Legal context
The Government of Jordan (GoJ) and international donors have introduced several policy initiatives to address
Syrians refugees’ long-term residence in Jordan. The cornerstone of these is the integration of refugees into
the Jordanian labor force (Hartnett 2019). The GoJ has employed an ambitious approach of labor force
integration of refugees to respond to the protracted refugee crisis. This journey had its beginnings in London in
February 2016 during the “Supporting Syria and the Region” conference, where the GoJ announced the
“Jordan Compact.” The Compact called for investments in Jordan that would create jobs and economic
opportunities, promote better trade conditions, and support programs that link humanitarian action to
development, thus benefiting Jordanians and refugees alike. As noted in the Compact, “Cumulatively these
measures could in the coming years provide about 200,000 job opportunities for Syrian refugees while they
remain in the country, contributing to the Jordanian economy without competing with Jordanians for jobs.”
Following the conference, the Jordanian government undertook the necessary administrative changes to allow
Syrian refugees to have work permits: the Ministry of Labor (MoL) began issuing one-year renewable work
permits in certain occupations open to non-Jordanians, while many administrative requirements were eased
(UNHCR 2017). In November 2018, the MoL issued a decision allowing Syrian refugees in Jordan to establish
their own home-based businesses (HBBs), in food processing, tailoring, and handicrafts (UNHCR 2019).

Work permits
Jordan allowed the Syrian refugees to work legally in its labor market and to find employment in “sectors open
to immigrants” such as agriculture, construction, services, wholesale trade, and manufacturing in the
qualifying industrial zones (QIZs). In July 2016, the European Union (EU) and Jordan also agreed to simplify the
“rules of origin” that Jordanian exporters use in their trade with the EU, in return for employing a minimum
percentage of Syrian refugees in the QIZs, 15 percent at the outset, increasing to 25 percent in year three
(European Training Foundation 2017).
Since the issuance of work permits began, a number of additional steps have contributed to more Syrian
refugees working formally. Agricultural cooperatives are allowed to facilitate access to work permits in the
sector, and work permits for Syrians remain free of charge. A recent decision of the MoL has also opened the
way for refugees in camps to work formally in cities across Jordan; in the Zaatari and Azraq camps, refugees
with a valid work permit can leave the camp for up to one month and access available jobs throughout the
country (UNHCR 2017).

Home-based businesses
The number of work permits held by refugee women is still low, although it did increase from 4 percent in 2018
to almost 7 percent in mid-2019. Discussions with women – including the beneficiaries of the UNHCR-funded
livelihoods project – continue to indicate a preference for women to work from home. The Cabinet decree in
November 2018 allowing Syrian refugees to register and operate HBBs has allowed UNHCR to continue to
support the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation in reaching the home-based businesses
“compact” target, which is 100 HBBs licensed and owned by Syrian refugees. Specifically, UNHCR in Jordan
aimed to support the establishment of some 80 HBBs by the end of 2019 (UNHCR 2019).
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B. Access to livelihood and employment opportunities
In Jordan, Syrian refugees now form an important demographic in the labor market, comprising one-fifth of the
total non-Jordanian workforce. They have entrepreneurial spirit and valuable skills in specific occupations
(UNHCR 2017). To enable Syrian refugees to access employment opportunities, a set of approaches are in
place: promoting entrepreneurship, facilitating skills development, providing loans, linking employers with
potential employees, and providing information on employment and Jordanian labor rights. As part of this
process, a number of small but innovative economic initiatives have been undertaken.
•

Assistance for employment preparedness. Since 2017, the Danish Refugee Council and Jordan River
Foundation have implemented a livelihood project based on the principle of the graduation approach,
whereby individuals who would be rotated out of government cash assistance are identified to be
potential beneficiaries. The project aims to improve the livelihoods of the target population and their
families through the implementation of small economic projects, by enabling access to available
economic opportunities through career guidance, intensive coaching, and sensitizing formal
participation in the labor force by obtaining work permits (UNHCR 2019).

•

Promoting entrepreneurship. The Danish Refugee Council and Jordan River Foundation started an
initiative to support 500 Syrian refugees to find positions with employers, set up their own small
businesses, and/or take part in training and apprenticeships. Support through small start-up grants
and financial literacy was provided, with the aim of refugee families becoming less dependent on cash
assistance and strengthening their assets to successfully graduate toward increased self-reliance
(UNHCR 2017).

•

Access to credit. UNHCR is partnering with the Swedish Development Agency and Grameen Credit
Agricole to promote financial inclusion of refugees for the years 2017–21. This program aims to
facilitate access to credit for refugees and host communities, for both income-generating activities
and cash-flow smoothing, with the goal of improving livelihoods, self-reliance, and resilience of the
target population (UNHCR 2017).

•

Camp employment centers. The Zaatari Employment Office and Azraq Center for Employment are part
of a unique UNHCR and ILO initiative to increase mobility of camp residents and to provide
employment information. Established inside the two refugee camps, the offices allowed refugees to
receive counseling services on employment, obtain work permits, and attend job fairs where they can
meet employers (UNHCR 2017; UNHCR 2019).

•

Support for artisanal work. A small group of Syrian refugee women with experience in sewing and
tailoring are trained by SEP Jordan, a fashion business, in the Jerash Palestinian Camp. The pilot
project’s objective is to introduce the trainees into the SEP workforce as freelancers and encourage
interaction with Palestinian refugees who have been settled in Jordan for 50 years as well as facilitate
economic empowerment (UNHCR 2017).

•

Cash for work. The cash-for-work scheme (also called Incentive-Based Volunteering) is an important
tool for short-term employment in the camps and an important cash injection in the camps’ economy.
In addition, it helps refugees gain work experience in selected sectors. Each month 6,500 refugees in
the Zataari camp and over 1,700 in the Azraq camp have a temporary occupation; they are recruited
as volunteers by many humanitarian organizations with an active presence in the camps (UNHCR
2017). Cash-for-work schemes have been operating in many of Jordan’s Syrian refugee camps since
their establishment, but more recently these activities have been rolled out to non-camp spaces as
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well. Besides, since 2017 attempts have been made to translate cash-for-work–based employment
into work permits.
•

Skills training. The Migrant Support Measures from an Employment and Skills Perspective project is
implementing interventions on formal and nonformal training of refugees. Most initiatives focus on
skills development, including life skills, soft skills, financial and market literacy, and language skills for
young people and vulnerable groups, as well as children who cannot continue in the formal education
system. However, most of the initiatives focus on only one type of intervention and do not combine
different measures in a single package (European Training Foundation 2017).

C. Integration of refugees
The GoJ’s initiatives and measures since early 2016 have sought to facilitate Syrian refugees’ access to the
formal labor market. The plan is intended to address both humanitarian obligations toward Syrian refugees
and Jordan’s economic development needs. Three strategies are in place to make the Jordan Compact happen
— the expansion, substitution, and formalization of employment (Lenner and Turner 2019).
•

First, the plan is to employ refugees in special economic zones and to boost Jordan’s economy by
attracting foreign investments through trade concessions.

•

Second, there are attempts to replace migrant workers with Syrians. This strategy is based on twin
goals of bringing Syrians into formal jobs and creating employment for Jordanians.

•

Third, there are attempts to formalize Syrian refugee labor. The number of work permits issued to
Syrians, as a result of strong pressure from some donor agencies, quickly became a core indicator of
the scheme’s success.

Refugee labor integration does not harm the host country labor force. In Jordan, this is because refugees and
citizens are not competing for the same jobs. The Jordanian government has prioritized issuing formal work
permits for Syrian refugees in sectors that Jordanians prefer to avoid, including agriculture, manufacturing, and
construction. Historically, these sectors have been dominated by migrant laborers, primarily Egyptians. Syrian
refugees are displacing other migrant groups in these sectors. The Jordan Compact's implicit intention of
prioritizing Jordanian labor has been successful, at least insofar as jobs have not been taken away from
Jordanian workers (Hartnett 2019).
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MALAYSIA: NO RIGHT FOR REFUGEES TO WORK
According to the UNHCR, as of March 2020, there were 179,520 registered refugees and asylum seekers from
various countries in Malaysia. Some 154,460 are from Myanmar, comprising 101,580 Rohingyas, and 52,880
other ethnic groups from Myanmar. There are 25,050 refugees and asylum seekers from other countries,
including Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Syria, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Iraq, and Palestine. Some 68 percent of
refugees and asylum seekers are men, while 32 percent are women (UNHCR 2020a). In Malaysia, the
Rohingya population consists of a mix of new arrivals and first- and second-generation refugees living in
protracted displacement. Most are stateless because Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law denies them the right
to citizenship, and refugees born in Malaysia are not granted Malaysian citizenship (Wake 2016).

A. Legal context
Malaysia is not a signatory to the UN Convention on Refugees. The country has no legal or administrative
framework for dealing with refugees (Jalil 2019). Malaysia, on humanitarian grounds, generally allows asylum
seekers and refugees to stay in the country. Although refugees are not recognized in national law or policy, they
are allowed to live in local communities once registered. The vast majority of Rohingyas are unable to obtain a
passport or citizenship document in Myanmar and arrive in Malaysia with a Myanmar identity document or no
documents at all. The primary (and often only) identity document used by Rohingya refugees in Malaysia is a
UNHCR card (Wake 2016).
In Malaysia, refugees lead a precarious existence on the margins of society, at risk for arrest as illegal
immigrants, since Malaysia makes no distinction between undocumented or illegal workers and refugees. A
majority of them live in urban areas and have no right to work (Ahmad, Rahim, and Mohamed 2016). With no
legal status, refugees are denied access to safe and lawful employment and equal protection of the law and
are vulnerable to arrest, detention, deportation, and exploitation if found working (Brown et al. 2018b).

Access to public services
Since refugees in Malaysia do not qualify for a legal status, their entitlement to public services is minimal.
UNHCR-registered refugees and asylum seekers are not entitled to government-funded social security.
Refugees in Malaysia are also not entitled to access the public school system. Some limited education is
provided instead through an informal parallel system of community-based learning centers. These centers are
administered by NGOs, charities, and the refugee community and are reliant on fundraising and international
aid. UNHCR currently has five implementing partners in the education sector that operate learning centers and
coordinate projects such as teacher training and teachers’ compensation. As a result of limited education
provision, only 33 percent of refugee children of schoolgoing age are enrolled in community learning centers
(Todd, Amirullah, and Shin 2019).

B. Access to livelihood and employment
In Malaysia, many local Malaysians regularly interact with refugees. In Kuala Lumpur, Rohingya refugees live in
pockets across the city: neighborhoods are mixed, comprising local Malaysians, immigrants, Rohingya
refugees, and refugees from various parts of the world. Malaysians have assisted refugees by supporting their
livelihoods (e.g., employing refugees or helping them secure jobs; providing investment capital for refugees’
businesses); overcoming bureaucratic restrictions (e.g., purchasing goods for refugees that they are prohibited
from buying themselves, such as motorcycles); facilitating their access to institutions (e.g., UNHCR); and
providing direct assistance (e.g., donations of cash and goods). Many refugees appreciated that Malaysians
sympathize or empathize with their plight (Wake and Cheung 2016).
Malaysia is a very restrictive environment for NGOs. Few international NGOs are able to register in Malaysia.
With limited NGO and state involvement, UNHCR has become the most prominent and influential formal
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institution in refugees’ lives, serving not only as the gatekeeper to registration and resettlement, but also the
most visible potential provider of financial, livelihoods, protection, and health support (Wake and Cheung
2016).
As in many countries, in Malaysia the topic of foreign workers is contentious, and refugees are often conflated
into the same category as undocumented or foreign workers. In the early 1990s, when large numbers of
Rohingya refugees first started coming to Malaysia, the government provided some with six-month work
permits; these were nonrenewable, however, and since then no work permit schemes for refugees have been
successfully implemented. Previous efforts to regularize the status of the Rohingya have failed amidst
accusations of fraud and corruption, including an attempt in 2006 to issue IMM13 permits (a type of
temporary residence permit that the Minister of Immigration can authorize at their discretion) to Rohingya
refugees. UNHCR has increasingly advocated for work permits for refugees in Malaysia (UNHCR 2016). In
recent years the Malaysian government has considered – and in numerous instances initiated the process of –
issuing work permits to refugees; most recently, a high-level government committee was formed to consider
the issue (Wake 2016; Lokman 2016).
In 2013, the Malaysian government announced it would provide refugees with work permits. However,
implementation has been slow. Though a pilot is underway to allow refugees to work legally, the project is only
open to Rohingya refugees who are cardholders and who have undergone health and security screenings.
Furthermore, employment opportunities are restrictive, with applicants placed in manufacturing or plantation
industries with no choice of employment themselves (Brown et al. 2018b).
Despite not having the legal right to work, many of the refugees and asylum seekers in Malaysia are engaged
in informal employment. This is unsurprising, given that refugees receive no welfare from the government, and
foreign aid and NGO support is insufficient to cover basic needs. The sectors that refugees and asylum seekers
are employed in is largely dictated by what is available to those working illegally, often including dirty,
dangerous, and difficult (“3D”) jobs. There are likely to be very few skilled jobs available in the informal labor
market, and therefore refugees and asylum seekers possessing higher skill levels will be unable to put these to
full use. Not all adult refugees and asylum seekers are informally employed. Based on the UNHCR statistics,
the labor participation rates among refugees and asylum seekers are lower than for the population as a whole.
Overall, the labor participation rate of UNHCR registered Rohingya refugees is 58 percent: 65 percent among
males and 29 percent among females (Todd, Amirullah, and Shin 2019).

C. Integration of refugees
The stance of the Government of Malaysia (GoM) toward refugees is, on the one hand, one of tacit and limited
acceptance, and on the other formal abdication of any responsibility for responding to the needs of people
seeking asylum in Malaysia. The formal response has ostensibly been delegated to UNHCR, whose work is
simultaneously made more difficult by state policies (such as detention) aimed at deterrence and exclusion,
and the hostility of the state toward the notion of Malaysia as a final destination country for refugees (Wake
2016; Lokman 2016).
The current position is that refugees are not allowed to work lawfully in Malaysia, and few receive assistance.
In a study by the International Rescue Committee, 92 percent of refugee respondents said that neither they
nor a member of their household had received humanitarian aid or services during the previous year (Smith
2012). Refugees often resort to working “3D” jobs in the informal sector, and the illegality of their status
renders them at increased risk of exploitation by employers (Wake 2016).
In Malaysia, many refugees are already working informally. However, refugees’ participation rate in the labor
force is lower than the national average, which is in part a result of the dangerous and unattractive nature of
the work available, including the fact that refugees and asylums seekers are vulnerable to arrest and detention
as they are working illegally (Todd, Amirullah, and Shin 2019).
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UNHCR in Malaysia works with the objective of facilitating refugees’ right to work and to establish strong,
representative refugee community-based organizations toward self-reliance. They work with local institutions,
social enterprises, and NGOs to provide livelihood and development assistance to individuals and communities
of concern (UNHCR 2020b). UNHCR has proposed the legal right to work, which would enable refugees to
accumulate social and capital resources, which could help them find a solution appropriate for their unique
circumstances. The GoM has implemented several work permit schemes for small, select groups of refugees,
but so far its policies are ad hoc (Jalil 2019).
In Malaysia, the reality is that local integration is the most likely durable solution for many Rohingya refugees.
While Malaysian policy does not support local integration of refugees, many have achieved some degree of
informal integration: most Rohingya refugees work in the informal sector, rent accommodations, access health
care at government facilities, and pray at Malaysian mosques. Yet many refugees spend years, decades, and
even generations living in limbo, lacking the prospect of a formal durable solution (local integration,
resettlement, or repatriation) (Wake 2016). In the absence of strong political will of the government, refugees
in Malaysia can only be informally integrated into the economy and community, with no future for themselves
and the generation to come.
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IV. Discussion
Local integration is generally regarded as a process which leads to a durable solution for refugees. The local
integration of refugees starts with a legal process, whereby refugees are granted a progressively wider range of
rights and entitlements by the host country. National and local refugee policies, including laws and
frameworks, are an important determinant in the extent to which refugees can achieve self-reliance in host
countries (Brown et al. 2018b). Refugee integration is determined by the conditions and environment in which
their settlement occurs. In an enabling context, refugees become self-reliant through employment or selfemployment. However, legal opportunities for refugees to work vary significantly across host countries. The
following discussion highlights the ways in which national policies and initiatives on refugee integration vary
across five countries: Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Jordan, and Malaysia. This section also explores the situation
of refugees’ right to work, for both de jure and de facto3 right to work.

REFUGEE RIGHT TO WORK
Uganda’s approach is noted as a model for refugee-hosting countries around the world due to its progressive
legislation granted by the 2006 Refugee Act and the Refugee Regulations 2010. In Uganda, refugees are
granted a wider range of rights and entitlements, including a legal right to work, freedom of movement, and
access to services such as education and health. Uganda uses an open settlement policy: it allows refugees
plots of land for residence and cultivation of crops and promotes freedom of movement for refugees to realize
opportunities, notably in education and income-generation, not restricted to the settlement.
Ethiopia follows encampment practices, but refugees can leave the camp with a permit to access specific
services. Refugees can live outside the camp under conditions of out-of-camp policy, specialist healthcare
needs, and serious protection concerns. Refugees are generally not allowed to work in Ethiopia, but there are
no legal restrictions on informal work. Ethiopia pursued restrictive labor policies for refugees in their country
until the introduction of the CRRF approach on local integration of refugees in 2017. Under this framework,
there is a provision of work permits to qualifying refugees and a fixed percentage of jobs within industrial
parks. Moreover, refugees living in protracted situations will have opportunities to integrate locally and live
outside camps.
In Kenya, refugees lack freedom of movement because of its policy of encampment. Camp residents in
possession of a movement pass can only travel to other parts of Kenya. Refugees are in general not allowed to
work formally. The Refugee Act of 2006 provides refugees the same right to employment as other nonnationals and allows them to have work permits. Refugees have the option to obtain work permits usually for
two years as permissible to non-nationals. Applications for permits need a recommendation from a prospective
employer and must be accompanied by a letter from the relevant government authority confirming refugee
status. In fact, difficulties in securing work permits restrict the work prospects of refugees in Kenya.
Since 2016, the Jordanian government has allowed both urban refugees and those refugees in the camps a
legal right to work. The government allows refugees to have work permits in certain occupations open to
immigrants/non-Jordanians. Camp refugees are allowed to work outside the camp which is conditional upon
securing legal permission to leave. Agricultural cooperatives allow free-of-charge work permits for Syrian
refugees. In November 2018, the Jordanian government issued a decision allowing Syrian refugees to
establish their own home-based businesses in food processing, tailoring, and handicrafts.
Malaysia is not a signatory to the UN Convention on Refugees. The country has no legal or administrative
framework for dealing with refugees. Malaysia, on humanitarian grounds, generally allows asylum seekers and
De jure rights are those recognized by official laws, while de facto rights exist and are accepted in practice but do not
have legal status.
3
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refugees to stay in the country. Refugees can live in local communities once registered. The current position is
that refugees are not allowed to work lawfully in Malaysia, and few receive assistance. The government has
implemented several work permit schemes for small, select groups of refugees, but so far its policies are ad
hoc.
To understand the situation of these five host countries in terms of granting work rights to refugees, five
typologies were used: (A) right to work in action, (B) right to work in progress, (C) restricted right to work, (D) no
right but allowed in practice, and (E) no right and restricted in practice. As shown in Table 1, none of these five
countries falls under Category A whereby the right to work is enforced and international standards are
incorporated into a fully functioning domestic policy without reservation. Among the study countries, the most
favorable condition for refugees’ right to work is observed in Uganda (Category B). Uganda has a national policy
and well-defined framework permitting refugees to work. In Jordan and Kenya, a certain proportion of refugees
are allowed to work in strictly defined sectors and occupations (Category C). In Ethiopia refugees are not
allowed to work, but there are no legal restrictions on informal work (Category D). Malaysia represents Category
E, the most restrictive in terms of granting work rights to refugees.
Table 1: Refugee right to work in five host countries
Rank

Typology

Definition*

Countries

Category A

Right to work
in action

Where the right to work is enforced. International standards are
incorporated into a fully functioning domestic policy without reservation,
and refugees’ right to work is explicitly cemented in national legislation.

None

Category B

Right to work
in progress
Restricted
right to work

Where there is a national policy permitting refugee right to work but it is not
entirely enacted and legal constraints remain.
Where there are severe legislative restrictions on formal refugee work that
may exclude certain groups. There may or may not be a national policy on
the right to work for refugees.
Where there is no existing national policy that respects refugees’ right to
work or the national policy prohibits refugees from working, but there are
no punitive legal restrictions from government or local authorities on most
informal work.
Where there is no existing national policy that respects refugees’ right to
work or the national policy prohibits refugees from working and this is
heavily policed.

Uganda

Category C

Category D

No right but
allowed in
practice

Category E

No right and
restricted in
practice

Jordan
Kenya
Ethiopia

Malaysia

*Adapted from: Brown, Alison, Peter Mackie, Kate Dickenson, and Tegegne Gebre-Egziabher. 2018. “Urban refugee
economies: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.” London: International Institute for Environment and Development.

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFUGEES
In Uganda, economic opportunities such as employment (formal and informal) and access to productive capital
are available for refugees, but they are not the same in rural and urban areas. In rural settlements, refugees
are primarily engaged in agricultural activities. Not many opportunities besides agriculture exist. The primary
non-agricultural income-generating activities for refugees and Ugandans are small business or petty trade.
Refugees who have self-settled in urban areas are engaged in various types of small businesses. Some are
engaged in entrepreneurial activities aiming to scale businesses where they can employ others. Refugees have
higher income and lower dependency levels in the city compared with the camp context.
Historically, the Ethiopian government enforced a restrictive encampment policy for refugees, barring refugee
access to work and mobility. In camps, refugees mostly survive on humanitarian assistance. Some are
engaged in economic activity within the camp or in the neighboring host markets. Refugees have access to
incentive work of local NGOs and UN agencies, are engaged informally in employment, and carry out informal
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trade with host communities. However, the isolation of the camps coupled with restrictions on access to labor
markets and employment resulted in a challenging environment for sustainable livelihoods for refugees. On
the other hand, refugees settled in urban areas become progressively integrated there in economic and social
terms. A wide number of refugees have been involved in Ethiopian-owned and refugee-owned informal
enterprises, hospitality business, construction, service provision, and work as casual day laborers, electricians,
and mechanics.
Similar to Ethiopia, the Kenyan government started to enforce a restrictive encampment policy for refugees in
the early 1990s. Economic opportunities are limited for refugees inside the camp and host communities. The
refugee camps in Dadaab and Kakuma are located in relatively underdeveloped regions, with vulnerable
economies. The majority of refugees are engaged in the camp work for humanitarian agencies (known as
incentive work), in shops, or in construction. Refugees are also engaged in self-employed enterprises. Trade in
camps is a huge business. Due to the remote location of the camps and physical curtailment, refugees’
socioeconomic opportunities are constrained by their lack of mobility and right to work. In contrast, some
refugees outside the camps have become self-reliant through employment in Nairobi’s thriving informal sector
and are able to access some health and educational services. Almost one-sixth of asylum seekers and
refugees in Kenya live in urban areas, mainly in Nairobi. Refugees find employment and self-employment
opportunities in the highly competitive informal sector. Among urban refugees, a few are successful
entrepreneurs.
Jordan allows the Syrian refugees legal work permits in the labor market and employment opportunities in
designated sectors open to immigrants. Jordanian exporters can enjoy trade benefits from European Union
countries in return for employing a minimum percentage of Syrian refugees. Syrian refugees living outside the
camps primarily work in construction, wholesale, retail and repair trades, agriculture, and manufacturing in
special economic zones. They often undertake entrepreneurial activities and have valuable skills in specific
occupations. They now form an important demographic in the labor market, comprising one-fifth of the total
non-Jordanian workforce.
The Malaysian government has pledged to provide refugees with work permits. However, implementation has
been slow. Employment opportunities are restrictive, with applicants placed in manufacturing or plantation
industries with no choice of employment themselves. Despite not having the legal right to work, many of the
refugees and asylum seekers are engaged in informal employment, particularly “3D” jobs (jobs that are
dangerous, dirty, and difficult). Refugees are vulnerable to arrest and detention as they are working illegally.
Table 2: Economic inclusion of refugees in five host countries

24

INTEGRATION OF REFUGEES
Uganda has a long history as a host country for refugees, and the integration of refugees into Ugandan society
has been a common occurrence. The legal structures of Uganda have shaped, and continue to shape, the
possibilities for local integration in this country. In Uganda, refugees are allowed to engage in both agricultural
and a wide variety of non-agricultural economic activities. Most importantly, refugees are given plots of
residential and agricultural land. The local population provides land for refugee settlement in exchange for
schools and health centers in the host community. Integrated services to refugee-hosting areas are now
provided to ensure that refugees and host communities benefit from shared, rather than parallel, services.
Refugees living outside the settlement can live and buy property as permissible to any foreign nationals. Since
2016, Uganda has started to integrate refugee programming into the national development plan.
Ethiopia’s refugee policy requires refugees to live in camps, with the exception of a small number of people
who are allowed to stay in urban centers because of special protection concerns or health needs. In addition,
since 2010 many more have been given the option of living outside the refugee camps as part of the
government’s out-of-camp policy. Refugees are entitled to engage only in informal income-generating activities.
Recently, the government of Ethiopia has been in the process of adopting a framework, similar to that of
Uganda, on local integration of refugees. In particular, the government has made pledges to shift from a campbased model of refugee assistance to an approach which emphasizes refugee self-reliance and refugee
mobility in-country.
Jordan has gained a reputation for its initiatives on labor force integration of refugees as a durable solution.
The government’s initiatives and measures since 2016 have sought to facilitate Syrian refugees’ access to the
formal labor market. Key strategies for labor force integration of refugees include the provision of work permits
to formalize employment of refugees and the employment of refugees in special economic zones to boost the
economy by attracting foreign investments. In parallel, the process also included: implementation of small
economic projects, access to available economic opportunities through career guidance, skills training, and
apprenticeships. Livelihood assistance programs are in place to provide financial literacy and awareness
trainings and provide support for business set-up by arranging work permits, small start-up grants, and credits.
In Kenya, the integration of camp refugees is hard to realize due to its policy of encampment and the remote
location of camps. However, urban refugees enjoy much higher levels of integration than camp refugees as
they are not confined to camps, can obtain work permits, can find economic opportunities in the formal sector,
have access to public services, and are socially networked into the host community. But this does not indicate
that every urban refugee is affluent and has completely integrated into the economy of Nairobi.
Malaysian policy does not support economic integration of refugees. There are no policies and initiatives that
promote refugees’ right to work.
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V. Conclusion
Economic integration of refugees is determined by the conditions and policy environment in which their
settlement occurs. The integration starts with granting the legal right to work. The right to work primarily entails
access to labor markets, business, entrepreneurship, and economic opportunities. UNHCR has identified other
close or related enabling rights, such as freedom of movement, housing, land, education, and property rights,
or access to relevant resources and services, such as financial services, training, social protection, or
employment and business registration, which can effectively support refugees to fully enjoy the right to work.
There are notable differences in the level and extent of economic integration of refugees across host countries.
In Uganda and Jordan, refugees have legal access to work. Uganda provides a unique example of refugee
integration as it has granted a wide range of rights and entitlements for refugees, including access to work in
the formal economy, freedom of movement, access to land for residence and cultivation, and access to the
health, education, and agricultural extension services similar to those of Ugandans. Refugees are not confined
to camps but can live in urban areas and buy property as permissible to any foreign nationals. Uganda provides
an important foundation in terms of the legal infrastructure to allow many refugees to lead independent lives.
Comparatively, Uganda's neighbors -- Kenya and Ethiopia -- have traditionally been more restrictive. Both Kenya
and Ethiopia rely on a system of encampment, where most refugees live in camps. In Kenya and Ethiopia,
refugees enjoy a limited right to work. Refugees can access informal work but their access to formal work is
restricted and well defined. In Kenya, some elements for de facto integration exist for urban refugees as they
can access better mobility and health and educational services, obtain work permits, access employment and
business, and are socially networked into the host community. Ethiopia is an important case study on refugee
economic inclusion. Historically, the Ethiopian government enforced a restrictive encampment policy for
refugees and only very recently has local integration of refugees become a possibility. The provision of work
permits to qualifying refugees, jobs within industrial parks, and access to irrigable land are notable efforts in
progress for economic integration of refugees, however, the country has a long way to go to fully implement
these policies.
Jordan is more progressive toward refugees than Ethiopia and Kenya. The Jordanian government has taken
an unprecedented legal step to support integration of Syrian refugees in its labor force. Jordan not only
provides work and business permits and employs refugees in special economic zones, but also provides
access to a wide range of support services including education, skills training, apprenticeship, finance, and job
placement services. Malaysian policy does not support economic integration of refugees and there is an
absence of progressive policies and initiatives that promote refugee access to work.
The national policies and initiatives of host countries define the extent of economic inclusion of refugees. A
comparison of the situation on the legal right to work reveals highly favorable conditions for refugee rights in
Uganda among these five host countries. Uganda has a national policy and well-defined framework permitting
refugees to work. In Jordan and Kenya, a certain proportion of refugees are allowed to work in strictly defined
sectors and occupations. In Ethiopia, refugees are not allowed to work in the formal economy, but there are no
legal restrictions on informal work. The Ethiopian government is now focusing on measures to extend refugee
rights and relax its camp-based approach. Malaysia is found to be most restrictive in terms of granting work
rights to refugees.
Of the five refugee-hosting countries, Malaysia is the most restrictive and least progressive in integrating
refugees locally. Ethiopia is the next most restrictive host country in terms of refugee integration. In host
countries like Ethiopia with no existing national policy that respects refugees’ right to work, but no legal
restrictions on informal work, the potential for inclusion of refugees in the formal economy is high. In host
countries like Malaysia, where national policy prohibits refugees from working, there is no alternative than to
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facilitate policy development to grant refugees the right to work. Advocacy efforts should build on the evidence
base demonstrating the potential and the positive impact that economic inclusion can have on refugees and
host communities.
The analysis of local integration of refugees has important implications for host countries regarding the
provision of employment and work opportunities for refugees. However, there are notable differences in the
economy and labor market by countries. None of the five countries belongs to the high-income economies.
Uganda and Ethiopia are low-income countries, Kenya lower-middle income, and Jordan and Malaysia uppermiddle income. In the three African countries, the labor market is mostly informal while labor markets in
Malaysia and Jordan are largely formalized. In general, urban refugees enjoy greater agency as they are
generally more mobile, resourceful, and socially connected when compared with camp-based refugees. The
review also found the Ugandan model and Jordanian approach worthy of being replicated in socioeconomically
comparable host countries. Uganda’s refugee legislature and policy are known worldwide, and Ethiopia to
some extent has begun to apply similar measures as both these countries have similar socioeconomic
contexts. Jordan’s initiative to integrate Syrian refugees into the labor market may be a suitable measure for
upper-middle income countries like Malaysia with a more formalized labor market. Yet, the predetermined
model or framework should not be readily adopted in situations of protracted displacement without examining
the legal, economic, and socio-cultural realities specific to the refugee context.
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